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I analyze a model of hold-up with asymmetric information at the contracting stage.
The asymmetry of information concerns the value of trade with external parties. I show
that contractual signalling and e¢ ciency of investment can conict if only quantity is con-
tractible. This conict generates ine¢ cient equilibria in terms of investment. Contracting
on exclusivity in addition to quantity resolves the conict and consequently eliminates
the ine¢ ciency of investment.
Keywords: Relationship-speci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JEL Classi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1 Introduction
Many relationships are formed under asymmetric information. When two or more parties meet
to agree the terms of a relationship, some may have private information on the value of the
relationship. For example, in vertical relationships, a nal good producer contracting with a
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specic supplier may have private information regarding potential trade with an alternative
supplier. Similarly, in labor market relationships, an employer o¤ering a job to a worker
may have private information about the t of the worker to the job position, or about the
possibility of subsequently nding a worker that ts better. As was emphasized by Myerson
(1983) and Maskin and Tirole (1992), if the parties with private information participate in the
design of the contract (or the terms of the relationship if established in an informal way), the
contracts terms may reveal some of their private information to the other parties. Because
of this information transmission e¤ect, the design of the contract assumes a strategic role
not present when contracting parties have symmetric information. When investment in the
relationship is important, this role is in addition to that of providing the parties with the right
incentives to invest that is typical to the hold-up problem literature.
This paper considers a model of hold-up with asymmetric information at the (ex-ante)
contracting stage, where traders may (ex-post) renegotiate the terms of trade. It identies how
exclusivity agreements may improve e¢ ciency. In particular there is a buyer (the principal)
and a supplier (the agent) where the supplier makes an own-investment which is unveriable
and match specic.1 An important feature of the analysis is the buyer might instead trade with
an external supplier (e.g., buy a generic version of the good) where the value of such trade is
stochastic. With symmetric information on the potential value of external trade, as in standard
models, the hold-up problem is solved by carefully setting the quantity in a contract whose terms
specify only a transfer and the quantity traded. With asymmetric information, however, where
the principal is better informed on the value of this outside option, such contracts are no longer
e¢ cient in that the agent does not invest the socially optimal level. Instead e¢ ciency is achieved
by introducing an exclusivity clause, a clause which restricts the principal to trade only with
the agent. Of course it may occur that the ex-post realized value of outside trade is su¢ ciently
high that it is more e¢ cient for the principal to trade with the external supplier. What is
essential, however, is that the exclusivity clause implies the principal must rst negotiate with
the agent to trade with the external supplier.
The e¢ ciency-enhancing e¤ect of exclusivity identied here rationalizes the use of contracts
that specify both quantity and exclusivity. Furthermore, it is important for the following two
1Focusing on own-investment by the agent (also called selsh investment) which a¤ects only the agents
value of trade, as opposed to investment that a¤ects both the principal and the agents valuations of trade
(often called cooperative investment), allows us to better assess the e¤ect of asymmetry of information at the
contracting stage on e¢ ciency of investment. In contrast with the case of selsh investment, a contract ensuring
e¢ cient cooperative investment may not exist even when information is symmetric at the contracting stage (see
for example Che and Hausch, 1999).
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reasons. First, in contrast to Segal and Whinston (2000), it rationalizes the use of exclusive
contracts in situations of hold-up with pure relationship-specic investments. Motivated by in-
formal discussions (in anti-trust and exclusive contracts) on whether exclusive provisions foster
relationship-specic investments, Segal and Whinston (2000) show that exclusivity does not
a¤ect investments that are fully relationship-specic, when information is symmetric at the
contracting stage.2 Second, it contributes to the unsettled debate on whether exclusive agree-
ments should be contractually allowed by courts or not. In this specic matter, a long-standing
concern of courts is that exclusive contracts serve anticompetitive purposes, and consequently
prevent e¢ ciency.
The emergence of equilibria with ine¢ cient investment when only quantity is contractible
is due to a conict between using the contract to provide the agent with the right incentives
to invest and using it to signal information to extract surplus. In particular, I show that when
the principal expects a low value of trade with the external party, she may initially commit to
trade an excessively high quantity with the agent. The principal does so to signal an expected
low outside option and, consequently, to convince the agent to accept a contract that allows
her to appropriate more of the surplus generated by the relationship with the agent. Such a
commitment successfully signals a low outside option because it is less costly to a principal
with a low outside option to do it than it is to a principal who a high outside option. The
problem of committing to trade such a high quantity with the agent is that it leads the agent
to overinvest in the relationship. The agent does so to protect his disagreement payo¤ (i.e., the
payo¤ if the initial contract is enforced) in the event of a contract renegotiation.
If the parties can contract also on an exclusive-dealing provision, the conict between sig-
nalling information to extract surplus and investment incentives can be resolved. This is for two
reasons. First, because contracted exclusivity serves as a signal of the principals information
about the value of her outside option. This is because it is more costly to a principal who
expects a high value of trade with an external party to initially commit to trade exclusively
with the agent than it is to a principal who expects that value of trade to be low. Second,
because in contrast to contracted quantity, exclusivity does not directly a¤ect the agents in-
vestment decision. Thus, when both quantity and exclusivity are contractible, the principal
2Segal and Whinston (2000) concerns mainly the case where parties cannot contractually specify a quantity
in advance. The case where parties can specify both a quantity and an exclusivity level is studied only in Section
6 of that paper. In De Meza and Selvaggi (2007), the authors show that exclusivity may a¤ect relationship-
specic investments. Their result di¤ers from that in Segal and Whinston (2000) because they consider a
di¤erent bargaining game. Our e¤ect is totally di¤erent from that in De Meza and Selvaggi (2007), as it stems
from the existence of asymmetric information at the contracting stage.
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can set contracted quantity to induce optimal investment by the agent, and adjust contracted
exclusivity, without a¤ecting the agents investment decision, to signal information and extract
surplus. Consider again the case of the principal who expects a low value of trade with the
external party. E¢ ciency of investment can be achieved by proposing a contract that prescribes
simultaneously a quantity that induces e¢ cient investment by the agent and full exclusivity.
Since exclusivity signals a low outside option for the principal, the principal has no need to
distort contracted quantity upward to signal this information.
Both the contractual distortions and the e¤ect of contractibility of exclusivity on relationship-
specic investment highlighted here are novel in the literature. This is because the existing lit-
erature on the hold-up problem (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Chung,
1991; Rogerson, 1992; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993; Aghion et al., 1994; Edlin and Reichel-
stein, 1996; Che and Hausch, 1999; Schmitz, 2002; Hori, 2006; Watson, 2007; Zhao, 2008; and
Buzard and Watson, 2012), and in particular that on the interaction between exclusivity and
relationship-specic investment (e.g., Segal and Whinston, 2000; and De Meza and Selvaggi,
2007), has focused on situations where parties information is symmetric at the initial con-
tracting stage. This paper extends the literature on the hold-up problem to the case in which
there is asymmetric information at the contracting stage. In the hold-up problem literature
(with symmetric information at the contracting stage), the contract is typically designed with
one goal: to provide the right incentives to invest. The presence of asymmetric information at
the contracting stage introduces a new role for the contract: signalling information to extract
surplus.
This paper is also related to the literature on contract design by an informed party. This
literature can be divided into two groups. The rst group focuses on the characterization (in
a general way) of the equilibrium contract proposal by an informed principal in a principal-
agent relationship (e.g., Myerson, 1983; Maskin and Tirole, 1990; Maskin and Tirole, 1992; and
Beaudry and Poitevin, 1993). The modelling approach in this paper is in the spirit of that in
Maskin and Tirole (1992). In the context of the model in this paper, I extend their analysis to
the case in which the agent makes a noncontractible investment decision. This extension is not a
trivial one. Maskin and Tirole (1992) assume that all payo¤-relevant variables are contractible.
In their model, the agents beliefs about the principals type a¤ect only the agents decision to
accept the contract proposed by the principal. In here, the agents beliefs at the end of the
contracting phase are still important. They a¤ect the agents investment decision, which in
turn a¤ects the principals payo¤ (and preferences over contracts). The second group of this
literature has studied contract design by an informed party in more concrete settings (e.g.,
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Aghion and Bolton, 1987; Aghion and Hermalin, 1990; Spier, 1992; and Nosal, 2006).3 The
articles in this literature have not studied specically the relationship between contractual
signalling and relationship-specic investment.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I present the model. In Section 3, I obtain
preliminary results and analyze the benchmark case of symmetric information contracting. In
Section 4, I show the existence of ine¢ cient equilibria in terms of investment when contracts
specify only quantity and how contractibility of exclusivity resolves this ine¢ ciency. In Section
5, I present concluding remarks.
2 The Model
There is a principal (e.g., a buyer) and an agent (e.g., a supplier) who contract on the terms of
trade.4 Both know that ex-post the principal has the possibility of instead trading with a second
(external) agent. The value of trade with this external agent is denoted VE and is stochastic.
Specically there are two states of the world, j 2 fL;Hg; and VE is considered a random draw
from c.d.f. Fj(:) where we assume FL(.) strictly rst-order stochastically dominates FH(:). The
benchmark case supposes the principal and agent both observe the state j before contracting.
The interesting case instead supposes asymmetric information, where the principal observes
the state j (her type) but the agent only knows that state j = H occurs with probability H ;
otherwise j = L with probability L = 1  H : For simplicity, it is assumed that VE is always
non-negative.
Following Maskin and Tirole (1992), the (informed) principal o¤ers a menu of contracts to
the agent. The agent either agrees to this menu, or rejects the o¤er and obtains a zero payo¤.
If the agent accepts the menu, the (informed) principal chooses one of the contracts listed in
that menu. This is the contract that governs the relationship between the principal and the
agent. A contract species an up-front transfer t 2 R from the agent to the principal, a quantity
q 2 [0; 1], and a level of exclusivity e 2 E  [0; 1]. Quantity q denotes the probability that
the principal and the agent must trade. The exclusivity variable e denotes the probability that
3For example, Aghion and Hermalin (1990) use a contract signalling model to show that imposing legal
restrictions on private contracts can enhance e¢ ciency. Spier (1992) identies a reason for contractual incom-
pleteness by showing that an informed principal can signal information by deliberately proposing an incomplete
contract to an agent. Nosal (2006) considers a situation of contract signalling when studying the incentives of
a principal to acquire private information before contracting with an agent.
4Trade can be interpreted here as a transaction of a good or, for example, as the joint implementation of a
project.
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the agreement is exclusive; i.e., that the principal cannot trade with an external party.5 When
exclusivity is contractible, E = [0; 1]. Noncontractible exclusivity is modeled by imposing
E = f0g.
After the principal and agent agree on the contract, the agent makes an investment a 2 R+0 ,
which a¤ects the agents value of trade with the principal. This value is given by vA(a), where
v0A > 0. The cost for the agent of investing a is  (a), where  
0 > 0. The principal values
trade with the agent as vP . The agents payo¤ is additive in the investment cost. Both parties
payo¤s are quasi-linear in money. Thus, in addition to any money transfers (and investment
costs), if the principal and agent trade with each other, they obtain values of vP and vA(a),
respectively. For future convenience, the value of trade between the principal and agent is
denoted V (a)  vP + vA(a).6
After the agent invests, the uncertainty about VE is resolved. The principal and the agent
observe the value of VE and, if the initial contract prescribes an ine¢ cient level of trade, they
have the opportunity to renegotiate trade to the e¢ cient level. As in Edlin and Reichelstein
(1996), Che and Hausch (1999), Segal and Whinston (2000) and Segal and Whinston (2002),
it is assumed that the bargaining shares of the principal and the agent during renegotiation
are exogenously specied.7 It is also assumed that the external party with whom the principal
can alternatively trade receives no surplus. This would be consistent, for instance, with a
case of competition among many external parties who are willing to trade with the principal
in the event she does not trade with the agent. More specically, at the renegotiation stage,
the principal and agent receive each one half of the renegotiation surplus in addition to their
disagreement payo¤s. The disagreement payo¤s of the principal and agent are the payo¤s in the
event they do not reach a renegotiation agreement and the initial contract is executed.8 Given
5The quantity and exclusivity variables can be interpreted as proportions of trade capacity. Under this
interpretation, quantity q represents the proportion of the trade capacity of the principal that is contractually
allocated to the agent, and exclusivity e represents the proportion of the remaining (1 q) of the trade capacity of
the principal that cannot be traded with an external party. The assumption that e is a proportion is not crucial.
All the results in the paper hold if contracts can only prescribe full exclusivity (e = 1) or full non-exclusivity
(e = 0).
6For example, if the principal is a buyer, the agent is a supplier with production cost c(a), and the buyer
needs at most one unit of the sellers product, then vP corresponds to the buyers valuation of the sellers product
and vA(a) =  c(a). The value created if the buyer and the seller trade is V (a) = vP + vA(a) = vP   c(a).
7An implicit assumption in the model is that the agent gains some bargaining power during the relationship.
This corresponds to situations where by investing in preparation for trade or by direct contact with the principal,
the agent learns more about the principal (e.g., about technology employed, nancial position, negotiation
strategies) leaving him in a better position in future negotiations.
8The assumption that the principal and the agent have equal bargaining shares at the renegotiation stage
is not crucial. All the results remain unchanged if instead of 1/2 we consider that the agents bargaining share
is  2 (0; 1). The important assumption is that the agent has some (strictly positive) bargaining power at the
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Principal and agent
agree on a contract
Agent invests
Principal and agent
learn value of trade VE
Principal and agent
renegotiate initial contract
Principal trades with agent
or with external party
Figure 1: The sequence of events.
contract c = (t; q; e), the disagreement payo¤s (ignoring sunk investment costs) are qvA(a)  t
for the agent and qvP + (1  q)(1  e)VE + t for the principal. The renegotiation surplus is the
di¤erence between the e¢ cient total surplus and the sum of the disagreement payo¤s. Since
the e¢ cient total surplus (also ignoring sunk investment costs) is maxfV (a); VEg, the agents
post-renegotiation payo¤ given initial contract c = (t; q; e), investment a, and trade valuation
VE is given by
uA(c; a; VE) = qvA(a)  t+ 1
2




maxfV (a); VEg   1
2
[q(vP   vA(a)) + (1  q)(1  e)VE]  t   (a). (1)
Similarly, the principals post-renegotiation payo¤ can be written as
uP (c; a; VE) =
1
2
maxfV (a); VEg+ 1
2
[q(vP   vA(a)) + (1  q)(1  e)VE] + t. (2)
Observe that as a result of renegotiation, the principal and the agent may not trade even
if they initially agreed on a contract. However, despite renegotiation, the original contract still
matters because it a¤ects the distribution of ex-post surplus, which in turn is important for
surplus extraction by the principal and investment by the agent. The sequence of events is
illustrated in Figure 1.
The ex-ante (before uncertainty about VE is resolved) expected payo¤s of the principal
and agent, which are relevant at the contracting and investing stages, depend on state j,
contract c, and investment a and are given, respectively, by UPj (c; a) = E[uP (c; a; VE) j j] and
renegotiation stage. Otherwise, his payo¤ would not depend on the private information of the principal, in
which case there is no need for the principal to signal her private information to be able to extract surplus from
the agent.
7
UAj (c; a) = E[uA(c; a; VE) j j]. It follows from direct observation of (1) and (2) that for all
j 2 fL;Hg, a 2 R+0 and c 2 C,
UAj (c; a) + U
P
j (c; a) = Sj(a), (3)
where Sj(a)  E [maxfV (a); VEg j j]    (a) is the e¢ cient total surplus (hereinafter, total
surplus) in state j given investment level a. This property of the expected payo¤s of the
principal and agent is a consequence of e¢ cient renegotiation and will be used in the analysis
of the equilibrium outcomes.
The rst-best level of investment given state j is given by a0j  argmaxa Sj(a). The agents
optimal investment, which depends on the contract c agreed with the principal and his beliefs
bH that j = H, is given by a(c; bH)  argmaxa(1 bH)UAL (c; a)+bHUAH(c; a). Observe that the
agents beliefs bH may di¤er from the prior H . The agent may revise his beliefs after observing
the menu of contracts proposed by the principal and again after observing the contract chosen
by the principal amongst those listed in the menu. It is assumed that Sj(a) and UAj (c; a) are
concave in a for all j 2 fL;Hg, and that both a0j and a(c; bH) are strictly positive. It is also
assumed that Sj(a) is di¤erentiable in a and UAj (c; a) is twice continuously di¤erentiable in a
for all j 2 fL;Hg.9
In the analysis that follows, the equilibrium concept used is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE).10
2.1 A Special Case
I present here a special case of the model which will be helpful to illustrate some of the results
obtained. Let the agents value of trade with the principal and cost of investment be, respec-
tively, vA(a) = a and  (a) = a2=2, where  > 0. Let the principals value of trade with the
external party VE take two values only: vP    and vP + , where  > 0. Also let the state
of the world a¤ect the distribution of VE in the following way: in state j, VE = vP    with
probability pj and VE = vP +  with probability 1   pj. Consider, in addition, the following
parametric assumptions: (i)  < vP ; (ii)  > 
2; and (iii) pH > pL. Assumption (i) ensures
that VE is always positive. Assumption (ii) ensures that for all relevant levels of investment,
9Concavity of Sj(a) and UAj (c; a) in a ensures that a
(c; bH) and a0j are unique. Di¤erentiability of Sj(a) and
UAj (c; a) in a and the fact that a
(c; bH) and a0j are strictly positive imply that a
(c; bH) and a0j are characterized
by the usual rst-order conditions. Finally, the fact that UAj (c; a) is twice continuously di¤erentiable in a ensures
that a(c; bH) changes smoothly with the contractual variables.
10See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a precise denition of a PBE.
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it is e¢ cient (ex-post) for the principal to trade with the external party if VE = vP + . Note
that if VE = vP   , then necessarily vP + vA(a) > VE. Thus, under this realization of VE,
it is e¢ cient ex-post for the principal to trade with the agent. If instead VE = vP + , then
whether vP + vA(a) > VE depends on the agents investment level; in particular, on whether
a > =. The assumption that  > 2 ensures that a0j < = for all j and that a
(c; bH) < =
for all c and bH . Finally, Assumption (iii) implies that the distribution of VE in state L strictly
rst-order stochastically dominates that in state H.
3 Preliminary Analysis and the Benchmark Case of Sym-
metric Information
Before we delve into the analysis of equilibrium contracts and investment, it is useful and
instructive to characterize the agents investment decision and the way the agents investment
a¤ects the principals expected payo¤. It is also instructive to analyze the benchmark case of
symmetric information contracting.
The agents investment decision. Given contract c and belief bH , the agent chooses invest-
ment so as to maximize his expected payo¤ (1  bH)UAL (c; a) + bHUAH(c; a). Since
UAj (c; a) =
1
2
E[maxfV (a); VEg j j]  1
2
[q(vP   vA(a)) + (1  q)(1  e)E[VE j j]]  (a)  t, (4)
the agents optimal investment is characterized by the rst-order condition
v0A(a)[(1  bH)PL(a) + bHPH(a) + q]=2 =  0(a), (5)
where Pj(a) = Pr[vA(a) + vP  VE j j]. Observe that Pj(a) is the ex-ante probability that
in state j and given investment level a, trade between the principal and the agent is e¢ cient.
Because parties agree on an e¢ cient level of trade during ex-post renegotiation, Pj(a) is the
ex-ante probability that the principal and the agent trade ex-post. Thus, it can be interpreted
as the ex-ante probability of success of the relationship between the principal and the agent.
From (5), one obtains that the agents investment decision depends on contract c only
through quantity q. Thus, henceforth I use a(c; bH) and a(q; bH) interchangeably. Moreover,
since PH(a)  PL(a) for all a, the agents investment level increases with bH . That is, the more
the agent believes that the trade relationship with the principal will be successful, the more
he is willing to invest in it. Finally, note that the agents investment decision increases with
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the contracted quantity q. When contracted quantity is high, the agents disagreement payo¤
at the renegotiation stage, qvA(a)  t, is very sensitive to his value of trade with the principal
vA(a). Therefore, his incentives to invest are also high in order to protect his disagreement
payo¤. I state without further proof these results in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 The agents investment decision a(q; bH) is increasing with contracted quantity q
and with the agents belief bH .
Agents investment and principals payo¤. Although the agents investment does not a¤ect
the principals value of trade with the agent vP , it a¤ects her expected payo¤. Notice that
UPj (c; a) =
1
2
E[maxfV (a); VEg j j] + 1
2
[q(vP   vA(a)) + (1  q)(1  e)E[VE j j]] + t. (6)
A higher investment by the agent then a¤ects the principals expected payo¤ through two
channels: by increasing the total surplus (rst term in (6)), which is a positive e¤ect, and by
increasing the agents disagreement payo¤ ( qvA(a) in the second term of (6)), which is a
negative e¤ect on the principals expected payo¤. Di¤erentiating UPj (c; a) with respect to a,
we obtain
v0A(a)[Pj(a)  q]=2: (7)
Therefore, which of the e¤ects is the dominant one depends on the relative values of the con-
tracted quantity and probability of success of the relationship. In particular, when contracted
quantity is zero, the total surplus e¤ect dominates, and therefore the principals payo¤ is
increasing with investment. When contracted quantity equals one (the maximum value it can
take), the reverse occurs. Finally, note from (7) and the fact that PH(a)  PL(a) for all a, that
the principals payo¤ responds more positively to agents investment when j = H, i.e. when
the probability of success of the relationship is high. For future convenience, I state without
further proof this result in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 For all a1; a2 2 R+0 such that a2  a1 and for all c 2 C, UPH (c; a2)   UPH (c; a1) 
UPL (c; a2)  UPL (c; a1).
The benchmark case of symmetric information contracting. Suppose that both the principal
and the agent know the state j at the contracting and investment stages. In this case, the
principals problem consists of choosing the contract that maximizes her expected payo¤ taking
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into account the individual rationality constraint and the investment decision of the agent, i.e.,




s.t. (i) UAj (c; a)  0




Because UPj and U
A
j are quasilinear in t, constraint (i)must bind in any solution to this problem.
Moreover, since the sum of the expected payo¤s of the principal and agent is necessarily identical
to the total surplus (i.e., (3) must hold), the principals problem can be rewritten as max
q;e;a
Sj(a)
s.t. a 2 argmax
a0
UAj (0; q; e; a
0). Hence, the principal always proposes the contract that induces
the agent to invest as e¢ ciently as possible and uses the transfer t to extract all the surplus
from the agent.
In the case of symmetric information, the rst-best level of investment is always imple-
mentable. Because Sj(a) = E[maxfV (a); VEg j j]   (a) (and by assumption Sj(a) is di¤eren-
tiable in a and a0j > 0), a
0





j) =  
0(a0j). (8)
From the rst-order condition that characterizes the agents investment decision (see (5)), we
obtain that the agents investment when he knows that the state is j necessarily satises
v0A(a)[Pj(a) + q]=2 =  
0(a): (9)
Comparing (8) and (9), we obtain that the principal can induce the agent to invest the rst-
best level of investment in state j by choosing q = Pj(a0j)  q0j , i.e., by setting in state j
the contracted quantity equal to the probability of success of the relationship evaluated at
the rst-best investment a0j . Thus, when information is symmetric, investment is e¢ cient in
equilibrium (rst-best) and the principal receives the rst-best total expected surplus Sj(a0j),
for all j 2 fL;Hg. Contractibility of exclusivity is not needed for this result. For future
convenience, let c0j denote the contract chosen by the principal in state j when information




j ) where t
0






I next come back to the case of the principal with private information at the contracting
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and investment stages.
4 Contractual Signalling and Relationship-Specic In-
vestment
In this section, I characterize equilibrium contracting between the principal and the agent and
equilibrium agents investment. As a consequence of ex-post renegotiation, trade is always
e¢ cient. This is because the levels of trade and exclusivity prescribed in the initial contract
can always be changed (without cost) to their e¢ cient levels after uncertainty about VE has
vanished. In contrast, the agents investment decision is irreversible at the renegotiation stage.
Hence, e¢ ciency of investment is not ensured by renegotiation. The literature on the hold-up
problem with symmetric information at the contracting stage and the benchmark case studied
above show that the ine¢ ciency of investment can be resolved (or mitigated) if parties choose a
contract that provides them with the right incentives to invest. In the present setting, because
of asymmetry of information, the principal uses the contract not only to provide incentives to
invest, but also to signal information to the agent in order to extract surplus. As we shall
see below, these two roles of contracting can conict with one another, and contractibility of
exclusivity may play an important role in solving this conict.
4.1 Quantity Contracts
Let us focus rst on the case of quantity contracts. Suppose that E = f0g, meaning that
exclusivity is not contractible. Thus, a contract is a transfer-quantity pair, i.e., c = (t; q).
These contracts are often referred to as specic performance contracts. The main purpose
here is to show that the investment level may be ine¢ cient in equilibrium when the principal
proposes this type of contracts. The main result appears in Proposition 2 at the end of the
subsection. I follow a procedure similar to that of Maskin and Tirole (1992). I rst dene
and characterize a specic type of allocation the best separating allocation.11 I then use it to
characterize equilibria.
Denition 1 A menu of contracts fbcL;bcHg constitutes the best separating allocation if and
only if, for all j 2 fL;Hg,
11This is the counterpart of the RSW allocation in Maskin and Tirole (1992) in the present setting with
noncontractible relationship-specic investments.
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UPj (bcj; a(bcj; j)) = maxfcL;cHg UPj (cj; a(cj; j)) (10)
s.t. (i) UPL (cL; a
(cL; 0))  UPL (cH ; a(cH ; 1)) (ICL)
(ii) UPH(cH ; a
(cH ; 1))  UPH(cL; a(cL; 0)) (ICH)
(iii) UAr (cr; a
(cr; r))  0; r = L;H (IRr)
where L = 0 and H = 1.
The best separating allocation is obtained by performing two independent maximizations,
one for the principal of type L (to obtain bcL) and one for the principal of type H (to obtain bcH).
In each, the principal maximizes her payo¤ within the set of menus that are incentive com-
patible for the principal, and regardless of the principals type, yield the agent a non-negative
payo¤. Note two things. First, incentive compatibility depends on the agents investment de-
cisions following the principals choice of contract c in fcL; cHg, which in turn depends on the
agents beliefs. In the denition of the best separating allocation we implicitly assume that
the agents beliefs are: bH = 0 after observing contract choice cL and bH = 1 after observing
contract choice cH (hereinafter, separating beliefs). Second, a best separating allocation is itself
incentive compatible given these separating beliefs.12 These two facts have two implications.
First, although obtaining the best separating allocation involves performing two independent
maximizations, the best separating allocation fbcL;bcHg solves the problem presented in (10) for
both j = L and j = H. Second, following the proposal of the best separating allocation by
the principal, there is always a continuation equilibrium in which the agent accepts the pro-
posal and the principal of type j chooses contract bcj from fbcL;bcHg, for all j 2 fL;Hg. These
two properties will be used below to obtain the best separating allocation and to characterize
equilibrium contracting and investment.
In the rest of the paper, I impose the following condition. That is, I focus on the cases in
which it holds.
Condition 1 The agents expected payo¤ (1 bH)UAL (c; a(c; bH))+bHUAH(c; a(c; bH)) increases
with bH when c species quantity q0L.
Condition 1 is a condition on the agents preferences regarding the principals type. It says
that when the contract species quantity q0L, the agent prefers that the principal is of type H
12For a formal statement and proof of this result see Proposition 4 in the Appendix.
13
rather than of type L.13 In our model, whether the agent prefers a principal of type L or of type
H depends on the contract under consideration. Indeed, when only quantity is contractible,
the agent prefers a principal of type H (with a low expected value of trade with the external
party) to a principal of type L (with a high expected value of trade with the external party) if
the contract species a su¢ ciently low quantity. The opposite occurs if the contract species
a su¢ ciently high quantity. The intuition is as follows. An increase in the principals value
of trade with the external party has two e¤ects on the agents payo¤. First, it contributes to
increase the agents payo¤ because the agent is able to appropriate some of that extra value
when renegotiating the initial contract. Second, it contributes to decrease the agents payo¤:
as the principals value of trade with the external party increases, the disagreement payo¤
of the principal increases; this improves the principals position during renegotiation of the
initial contract allowing the principal to appropriate more of the surplus. Contracted quantity
a¤ects the magnitude of this second e¤ect. When the contract prescribes a su¢ ciently low
quantity, the principal commits to trade only a small quantity with the agent. Thus, even if
the contract is enforced, the principal is free to trade a high quantity with an external party,
implying that the principals disagreement payo¤ increases signicantly with the principals
value of trade with the external party. In this case, the second e¤ect is dominant and the agent
prefers a principal with a lower value of trade with the external party (principal of type H).
When contracted quantity is high, the opposite occurs. The second e¤ect becomes muted or
negligible. In that case, the agent prefers a principal with a higher value of trade with the
external party (principal of type L).
Whether Condition 1 is satised depends both on the specic values (or distribution) of the
trade valuations and on the specications of the agents investment. Consider, for example, the
special case of the model presented in Section 2.1 where VE can take two values (vP    with
probability pj and vP +  with probability 1  pj, in state j), vA(a) = a and  (a) = a2=2. In
this case, q0L = pL. Condition 1 is satised if and only if pL  =(2   2). This condition is
always satised when for example pL  1=2. Condition 1 allows us to concentrate our attention
on the payo¤s in state H. As we will see below, it has two implications. First, the payo¤ of the
principal in state L associated with the best separating allocation is the rst-best total surplus
SL(a
0
L). Second, in state L the principal can ensure herself at least SL(a
0
L), regardless of the
agents beliefs. I return to this issue at the end of Section 4.2, where I briey discuss how the
13A similar assumption is imposed in Maskin and Tirole (1992) who, in their analysis of the principal-agent
relationship with an informed principal, assume that the agent prefers that the principal is of a higher type for
almost all contracts (see the second paragraph of Section 2 of Maskin and Tirole, 1992).
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results may change when Condition 1 does not hold.
I now characterize the best separating allocation and the payo¤ of the principal associated
with it. In what follows, let bUPL and bUPH denote the principals payo¤s associated with the best
separating allocation
Lemma 3 Contract bcL = c0L and bUPL = SL(a0L). If UPL (c0L; a0L)  UPL (c0H ; a0H), then bcH = c0H
and bUPH = SH(a0H). Otherwise, bcH = (btH ; q) where q > q0H and btH = UAH(0; q; a(q; 1)), andbUPH = SH(a(q; 1)) < SH(a0H).
Lemma 3 is proved in the Appendix. Under Condition 1, given separating beliefs, it is
always possible to construct an incentive compatible menu of contracts satisfying the agents
individual rationality constraint in both states L and H (i.e., a menu satisfying the constraints
of problem (10)), with a contract cL that leaves the principal of type L with the rst-best
total surplus SL(a0L). The only contract cL compatible with that payo¤ and constraint IRL is
precisely contract c0L, which species quantity q
0
L that induces e¢ cient investment by the agent
and transfer t0L that allows the principal to extract all the surplus from the agent in state L
(i.e., IRL binds).14 This is the contract bcL associated with the principal of type L in the best
separating allocation.
Consider now the case of the principal of type H. Given the observation made above
that the best separating allocation fbcL;bcHg must solve (10) for both types of principal, after
knowing that bcL = c0L we can restrict without loss of generality to menus of the type fc0L; cHg
when solving (10) for j = H. The solution to this (new) problem critically depends on whether
contracts c0L and c
0






L)  UPL (c0H ; a0H). In the
special case of the model presented in Section 2.1, for example, this condition is satised if and





L)  UPL (c0H ; a0H), contracts c0L and c0H , which induce rst-best investment and
allow full surplus extraction by the principal in both states L and H, are also incentive com-
patible. So, they constitute the best separating allocation. In this case, the investment level is
e¢ cient and the payo¤ of the principal of type H associated with the best separating allocation
is the rst-best total surplus SH(a0H).
14Observe that, given state L, if the principals payo¤ equals the rst-best total surplus, then the agents
payo¤ is non-negative only if investment is e¢ cient, i.e., a0L. Moreover, when the agents beliefs are bH = 0,
only a contract specifying quantity qL = q0L induces the agent to choose the rst-best investment a
0
L.
15Thus, for example, if pH < 1=2 (i.e., if pH is not too large), then (2pH   1)=2 < 0 and this condition will
not be satised. In contrast, if pH ' 1 (i.e., pH is su¢ ciently large), then (2pH   1)=2 > 1 and this condition
necessarily holds. Note that by assumption  > 2.
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H), the contracts that induce rst-best investment and
allow full surplus extraction in both states L and H are not incentive compatible. In this
case, ICL (and not IRH) is the binding constraint of problem (10) for j = H when contract
cH species quantity qH = q0H . If cH species quantity q
0
H and satises ICL, the agent will be
left with positive surplus. A tension between e¢ ciency in investment and surplus extraction
emerges. The optimal contract for the principal of type H is obtained by distorting upward the
quantity specied in cH and adjusting the transfer in a way that leaves the principal of type
L indi¤erent, i.e. ICL continues to bind. Doing so increases the payo¤ of the principal of type
H because an increase in contracted quantity is less costly (more benecial) to the principal
of type H than to the principal of type L. This is so because of two reasons. First, because
it is less costly to the principal of type H (who expects a low value of trade with the external
party) to initially commit to trade a higher quantity with the agent than it is to the principal
of type L (who expects a high value of trade with the external party). This is a direct e¤ect.
Second, because a higher contracted quantity induces more investment by the agent, and the
principal of type H values investment by the agent more than the principal of type L. This is
an indirect investment e¤ect.
Hence, in this case, the solution to the problem involves a contract cH with quantity q > q0H .
In contrast to the previous case, the outcome associated with the best separating allocation is
ine¢ cient in terms of investment: to appropriate more of the surplus generated, the principal
of type H sets an excessively high quantity, q > q0H , leading the agent to overinvest in the
relationship. This completes the derivation of the best separating allocation. I now proceed to
the characterization of equilibrium outcomes.
As argued above, following the proposal of the best separating allocation fbcL;bcHg by the
principal, there is a continuation equilibrium in which the agent accepts the principals proposal
and then the principal chooses contract bcL if she is of type L and contract bcH if she is of type H.
Hence, the remaining question is whether both types of principal proposing fbcL;bcHg followed
by this separating continuation equilibrium constitutes an equilibrium of the overall game, i.e.,
whether there exist beliefs and continuation equilibria o¤-the-equilibrium path such that no
type of principal gains by deviating and proposing a menu of contracts di¤erent from fbcL;bcHg.
The next proposition, which is proved in the Appendix, claries this question. In what follows,
let M denote the set of nite menus of contracts.
Proposition 1 If both types of principal propose a menu m 2 M , followed by a continuation
equilibrium (after menu proposal) in which the principals payo¤s eUPL and eUPH are such that
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eUPj  bUPj for all j 2 fL;Hg, then there are o¤-the-equilibrium path beliefs such that this
proposal and continuation equilibrium constitutes an equilibrium outcome of the overall game.
An implication of Proposition 1 is that both types of principal proposing the best separating
allocation, followed by the respective separating continuation equilibrium, always constitutes
an equilibrium of the game. This fact, together with Lemma 3, leads directly to the rst part
of the following proposition.











H) there exist ine¢ cient equilibria where the agent overinvests relative
to the rst-best level of investment in state H. Moreover, for some specications of the model,
only ine¢ cient equilibria exist.
Proposition 2 is proved in the Appendix. To illustrate this proposition, consider again the
special case of the model presented in Section 2.1. As mentioned above, if pL > (2pH   1)=2
(and, of course, if pL  =(2  2) so that Condition 1 is satised), UPL (c0L; a0L) < UPL (c0H ; a0H)
and the best separating allocation involves overinvestment by the agent in state H. So, in
this case, there exist ine¢ cient equilibria where the agent overinvest in state H. In these
equilibria, the principal of type H o¤ers to the agent a contract where she commits to trade
with the agent an excessively high quantity. The principal does so to signal a low outside
option. By signalling this information, the principal convinces the agent to accept a contract
that allows her to appropriate more of the surplus generated by their relationship. But given
such a contract, the agent overinvests in the relationship to improve his default position (payo¤
if initial contract is enforced) in the event of a renegotiation. Interestingly, when the (prior)
probability H that the principal is of type H is su¢ ciently high, these equilibria coexist with
e¢ cient equilibria where the agent invests the rst-best level of investment. However, for lower
values of H , there are parameter values for which no e¢ cient equilibria in terms of investment
exist. This is the case, for example, when pL = pH=2, 0:4 < pH  0:5, and H is su¢ ciently
low.
Proposition 2 is important not only because of the specic e¢ ciency implications that it
has, but also because it emphasizes that surplus extraction and e¢ ciency of investment can
in fact conict with one another when parties contract under asymmetric information. I next
allow exclusivity to be contractible and show it has an important role in mitigating this conict.
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4.2 Quantity and Exclusivity Contracts
Suppose now that both quantity and exclusivity are contractible, i.e., E = [0; 1]. In this case,
a contract is a triple c = (t; q; e). To characterize the equilibrium allocations and payo¤s, I
start by presenting in Lemma 4 lower bounds for the principals equilibrium payo¤s. Then,
in Proposition 3, I present the equilibrium payo¤s themselves and characterize equilibrium
investments. The following Lemma is proved in the Appendix.
Lemma 4 Suppose that quantity and exclusivity are contractible (E = [0; 1]). Then, in any
equilibrium, the payo¤ of the principal of type j is at least the rst-best expected total surplus
Sj(a
0
j), for all j 2 fL;Hg.
Contractibility of exclusivity plays no role in ensuring to the principal of type L the rst-
best total surplus SL(a0L). Under Condition 1, the principal of type L always achieves this
payo¤ even if exclusivity is not contractible. In contrast, in the case of the principal of type H,
it is the fact that exclusivity is contractible that allows the principal to construct a contract
that guarantees her the rst-best total surplus SH(a0H).
To illustrate the role of exclusivity when the principal is of type H, consider the expected
payo¤ of the agent given contract (t = 0; q; e), state j and investment a. This payo¤ can be
written as
UAj (0; q; e; a) =
1
2
E[maxfV (a); VEg j j]  1
2
[q(vP   vA(a)) + (1  q)(1  e)E[VE j j]]   (a):
When the contract prescribes full exclusivity, i.e., e = 1, the agents expected payo¤ is a¤ected
by state j only through the term E[maxfV (a); VEg j j]=2. Therefore, from the fact that FL
rst-order stochastically dominates FH , it follows that for all a and q
UAL (0; q; e = 1; a)  UAH(0; q; e = 1; a). (11)
Intuitively, when the principal promises full exclusivity, the agent is better o¤when the principal
has a high outside option (state L), since he can appropriate part of it at the renegotiation
stage by threatening to enforce the contract and prevent the principal from trading with the
external party.
From (11), it follows that the agents expected payo¤ (1   bH)UAL (c; a) + bHUAH(c; a) when
a = a(c; bH) and c = (0; q; e = 1) is decreasing in his belief bH , for any given quantity q in c. In
particular, this holds for q = q0H . This implies that regardless of the agents beliefs, he always
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H ; 1; a
(q0H ; 1)), i.e., his expected payo¤when
his beliefs are bH = 1 (his worst possible payo¤ across beliefs). Hence, exclusivity allows the
principal to construct a contract in which the agent is better o¤ in state L than in state H:
This is also possible when exclusivity is not contractible if the principal sets a su¢ ciently high
quantity in the contract. The problem in doing so, however, is that she distorts the agents
investment decision.
I now turn to the question of equilibrium payo¤s and investments.
Proposition 3 Suppose that quantity and exclusivity are contractible (E = [0; 1]). Then, in
any equilibrium, investment levels are e¢ cient (rst-best in both states) and the principal always
appropriates the rst-best total surplus, i.e., the equilibrium payo¤ of the principal in state j is
Sj(a
0
j) for all j 2 fL;Hg.
Proposition 3, which is proved in the Appendix, establishes that in any equilibrium when the
principal can contractually use both quantity and exclusivity, the investment levels are e¢ cient
in both states L and H. To illustrate why e¢ ciency is always obtained when both quantity and
exclusivity are contractible (as opposed to the case when only quantity is contractible), consider











H) and, therefore, ICL is the binding constraint of problem (10) for the
principal of type H. Recall that, in that case, investment is ine¢ cient because the principal
sets an excessively high quantity (q > q0H) in order to signal information and extract more
surplus from the agent. When exclusivity is contractible, instead of increasing quantity above
q0H , which induces the agent to overinvest in the relationship, the principal can set quantity q
0
H
and use (increase) exclusivity to move along the ICL constraint, signal her type, and extract
surplus from the agent. Surplus extraction can be achieved in this way because exclusivity
signals a low expected value of trade with the external party and does not directly a¤ect the
agents investment decision, implying that signalling information through exclusivity does not
interfere with provision of investment incentives.
The preceding analysis shows that contractibility of exclusivity has important e¢ ciency
implications. I conclude this section with a brief discussion of the robustness of the results
obtained. The analysis has focused on the cases in which Condition 1 holds. However, the
basic mechanism through which contractibility of exclusivity a¤ects equilibrium and e¢ ciency
allowing the principal to signal information about the value of trade with the external party
 is present even when Condition 1 is not satised. Note, for example, that contractibility
of exclusivity allows the principal to appropriate the entire e¢ cient total surplus in state H
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irrespective of Condition 1 being satised. More generally, it allows the principal to design
contracts that more easily satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints in the denition of the
best separating allocation see (10).16 Another important assumption is that on the structure
of the principals private information. It is assumed that in state L the distribution of the
value of trade of the principal with an external party dominates in a rst-order stochastic
sense the distribution of that valuation in state H. Again, the basic mechanism through which
contractibility of exclusivity a¤ects equilibrium and e¢ ciency is present if, for example, we
consider instead the weaker assumption that the expected value of the principals trade with
the external party is higher in state L than in state H. Exclusivity signals low outside option in
this case because, as under the assumption of rst-order-stochastic dominance, it is more costly
to a principal who expects a high value of trade with an external party to commit initially to
trade exclusively with an agent than it is to a principal who expects a low value of trade with
an external party. The above discussion suggests that the role of exclusivity highlighted in
the paper holds even when not making those assumptions. However, obtaining formal results
without them becomes di¢ cult.
5 Conclusion
The literature on contractual solutions to the hold-up problem has focused on situations where
the parties to the contract have symmetric information when contracting about future transac-
tions. In this paper, I depart from this literature by examining a situation in which the party
that designs the contract has relevant private information at the contracting phase. I show that
because of information concerns, the contract designer may distort the contracts terms relative
to those that induce e¢ cient investment in order to signal information and appropriate more of
the surplus generated. I also show that the ability to include exclusive clauses in the contract
may play an important role in eliminating these distortions and, consequently, the ine¢ ciency
of investment.
Regarding the literature on the e¤ect of exclusive contracts on relationship-specic invest-
ment, the analysis in this paper complements that in Segal and Whinston (2000) and De Meza
and Selvaggi (2007) where information is symmetric at the contracting stage. Following a co-
operative approach to model renegotiation, Segal and Whinston (2000) show that renegotiable
exclusivity contracts have no e¤ect on relationship-specic investment. De Meza and Selvaggi
16In particular, the principal can achieve this by proposing contracts with a higher exclusivity level when the
principal expects a low value of trade with external parties.
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(2007) point out that if the bargaining solution to renegotiation is non-cooperative, exclusivity
may a¤ect relationship-specic investments. The present paper contributes to this literature
by providing a novel channel through which exclusive agreements a¤ect relationship-specic in-
vestments. Concretely, because exclusivity signals information, it helps to mitigate the conict
between signalling information and providing incentives to invest that is present when parties
contract under asymmetric information.
On a more practical level, this paper o¤ers an explanation as to why contracts often specify
simultaneously both a quantity to be traded in the future and an exclusivity clause. It also
o¤ers an explanation as to why rms voluntarily bind themselves by committing to trade
exclusively with another rm. More specically, the results in the paper suggest that asymmetry
of information about external trade values may be an important driver of the use of exclusivity
contracts. This is an implication that, in principle, can be empirically identied. Perhaps one
way to do so is to analyze whether exclusivity is more likely to emerge in situations where
parties are contracting about transactions for the rst time than in situations where parties
have traded regularly in the past, as in the former cases asymmetry of information is more likely
than in the latter cases. The e¤ect of exclusivity that I highlight here may also be important
for policy design. The major (and unsettled) debate on that front is on whether exclusive
agreements serve anticompetitive purposes and, as a consequence, on whether they should be
contractually allowed. By showing that contractibility of exclusivity may enhance e¢ ciency of
investment, this paper suggests that a policy that systematically prohibits exclusive contacts
may be misguided.
Finally, the analysis is this paper has focused on the case in which the principal has private
information about her value of trade with an external party. However, it can be easily extended
to the case where the principals private information is about her value of trade with the agent
(vP in the model). Interestingly, all the results in Section 4.1 continue to hold in this case,
meaning that in some cases ine¢ cient equilibria in terms of investment exist if the principal
and agent use quantity contracts only. However, in this case the use of exclusivity clauses has
no e¤ect on the e¢ ciency of investment. In fact, it is totally irrelevant as it does not a¤ect the
set of equilibrium outcomes relative to the case where only quantity contracts are used.17
17A formal analysis of this case can be found in Vasconcelos (2008). A distinction has been made in the
contract-theory literature between public and private actions (see Watson, 2007, and Buzard and Watson,
2012). As shown by Watson (2007), this distinction is important because, in some cases, considering trade
actions as public instead of as individual actions, restricts implementation. While in this paper trade actions
are modeled as public actions this irrelevance of exclusivity continues to hold even if the principals action to
trade with the external party is modeled as an individual action.
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This observation allows us to establish an interesting parallelism between the results in Segal
and Whinston (2000) and those in the present paper. In Segal and Whinston (2000), exclusivity
has no e¤ect on relationship-specic investments. Exclusivity a¤ects only investments by the
contracting parties that have an impact on the value of trade with external parties. Similarly,
the results in the present paper suggest that contractibility of exclusivity a¤ects equilibrium
outcomes and investment only if the private information of the contracting parties concerns the
value of trade with an external party.
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Appendix
This appendix is organized as follows. I start by formally stating and proving the claim
made in the text that a best separating allocation is incentive compatible for the principal given
separating beliefs. This is done in Proposition 4 and its proof. I then state and prove two new
lemmas, Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, which are used in the proofs of the lemmas and propositions
in the text. Finally, I prove the lemmas and propositions in the text, with the exception of
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 which, as mentioned in the text, are stated without further proof.
Proposition 4 A best separating allocation fbcL;bcHg is incentive compatible for the principal
given the separating beliefs.
Proof. I only show here that UPH(bcH ; a(bcH ; 1))  UPH(bcL; a(bcL; 0)). The proof that UPL (bcL; a(bcL; 0)) 
UPL (bcH ; a(bcH ; 1)) is perfectly analogous and therefore omitted. Let fbcL; cHg be a solution to
problem (10) for j = L. First, because fbcL; cHg must satisfy the ICH constraint in the prob-
lem, we obtain that UPH(cH ; a
(cH ; 1))  UPH(bcL; a(bcL; 0)). Second, because the constraints of
problems (10) for j = L and for j = H coincide, fbcL; cHg also satises all the constraints of
problem (10) for j = H. Optimality of bcH implies that UPH(bcH ; a(bcH ; 1))  UPH(cH ; a(cH ; 1)).
From this inequality and the fact shown above that UPH(cH ; a
(cH ; 1))  UPH(bcL; a(bcL; 0)), it
follows that UPH(bcH ; a(bcH ; 1))  UPH(bcL; a(bcL; 0)).
Lemma 5 UAL (t; q = 1; e = 0; a)  UAH(t; q = 1; e = 0; a) for all t 2 R and all a 2 R+0 .
Proof. By taking expectations of (1), we obtain that UAj (t; 1; 0; a) = E[maxfV (a); VEg j
j]=2  [vP   vA(a)]=2   (a)  t. Clearly, UAL (t; q = 1; e = 0; a)  UAH(t; q = 1; e = 0; a) if and
only if E[maxfV (a); VEg j L]  E[maxfV (a); VEg j H], which follows directly from the fact
that maxfV (a); VEg is an increasing function of VE and FL rst-order stochastically dominates
FH .
Lemma 6 Suppose that ICL is the binding constraint of problem (12) (presented in the Proof
of Lemma 3 below) when q = q0H . Then there exists q 2 [q0H ; 1] such that ICL is the binding
constraint for qH 2 [q0H ; q] and IRH is the binding constraint for qH 2 [q; 1]. Moreover, If
a contract c = (t; q) satises simultaneously UPL (c; a
(c; 0))  SL(a0L) and UPH(c; a(c; 0)) >
SH(a
(q; 1)) then q > q.
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Proof. I start by showing the rst part of the lemma. Constraints ICL and IRH of problem (12)
can be written as tH  SL(a0L) UPL (0; qH ; a(qH ; 1)) and tH  UAH(0; qH ; a(qH ; 1)), respectively.
The right-hand side of both inequalities is continuous in qH . Moreover, UAH(0; qH ; a
(qH ; 1)) >
SL(a
0
L)   UPL (0; qH ; a(qH ; 1)) when qH = q0H , since by assumption ICL is the binding con-
straint when qH = q0H . Hence, it su¢ ces to show that U
A
H(0; qH ; a
(qH ; 1))  SL(a0L)  
UPL (0; qH ; a
(qH ; 1)) when qH = 1 and that UAH(0; qH ; a
(qH ; 1))  [SL(a0L) UPL (0; qH ; a(qH ; 1))]




UAL (0; 1; a
(1; 1))  SL(a0L)   UPL (0; 1; a(1; 1)), where: (i) the rst inequality follows directly
from Lemma 5 (in this appendix); and (ii) the second inequality follows from (3) and the fact
that a0L = argmaxa SL(a). I next show the latter condition. Using (1) and (2) and the fact that
Sj(a
(qH ; 1)) = E[maxfV (a(qH ; 0); VE)g j j]  (a(qH ; 0)), we obtain that UAH(0; qH ; a(qH ; 1)) 
[SL(a
0
L) UPL (0; qH ; a(qH ; 1))] =  SL(a0L)+12SL(a(qH ; 1))+12SH(a(qH ; 1))]+12(1 qH)(E[VE jL] 
E[VE jH]). First, note that both SL(a(qH ; 1)) and SH(a(qH ; 1)) decrease with qH when
qH  q0H , since: (i) a(q; 1) is increasing in q (Lemma 1); (ii) a(q; 1)  a0j 8j 2 fL;Hg when
q  q0H ; and (iii) Sj is concave. Finally, note that (1   qH)(E[VE j L]   E[VE jH]) decreases
with qH , since the fact that FL strictly rst-order stochastically dominates FH implies that
E[VE j L] > E[VE j H].







(c; 0)) > SH(a(q; 1)) are equivalent to SH(a(q; 1))   UPH(0; q; a(q; 0)) <
t  SL(a0L) UPL (0; q; a(q; 0)). Hence, they hold simultaneously only if SH(a(q; 1)) SL(a0L) <
UPH(0; q; a
(q; 0))   UPL (0; q; a(q; 0)). Since by Lemma 2 the right-hand side of this inequal-
ity increases with q, it su¢ ces to show that the inequality is not satised when q = q.
To obtain this, note that SH(a(q; 1))   SL(a0L) = UPH(0; q; a(q; 1))   UPL (0; q; a(q; 1)) 
UPH(0; q; a
(q; 0))   UPL (0; q; a(q; 0)), where: (i) the rst equality follows from the fact that
SH(a
(q; 1)) = UPH(0; q; a
(q; 1)) + UAH(0; q; a
(q; 1)) and the fact that ICL is the binding con-




L (0; q; a
(q; 1)) + UAH(0; q; a
(q; 1)); and
(ii) the inequality follows from the fact that UPH(0; q; a
(q; bH))   UPL (0; q; a(q; bH)) increases
with bH , which is an implication of Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof is given by the following steps.
Step 1: bcL = c0L.
This is proved by showing that the menu of contracts fc0L; cH = (tH ; q0L)g, where tH is
such that UPH(cH ; a





(q0L; 0)), constitutes a solution to problem (10) for
j = L. By construction, fc0L; cHg satises IRL and ICH . From: (i) Lemma 2, (ii) the fact
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that a(q0L; 1) > a
(q0L; 0), and (iii) quasilinearity of U
P
j in t for all j 2 fL;Hg; it follows that
UPL (cH ; a
(q0L; 1)) UPL (c0L; a(q0L; 0))  UPH(cH ; a(q0L; 1)) UPH(c0L; a(q0L; 0)) = 0. Thus, fc0L; cHg
satises ICL. Now, note that condition UPH(cH ; a





(q0L; 0)) is equivalent to
t0L  tH = UPH(0; q0L; a(q0L; 1)) UPH(0; q0L; a(q0L; 0)). Since PH(a)  q0L 8a 2 [a(q0L; 0); a(q0L; 1)],
we obtain that UPH(0; q
0
L; a) increases with a;8a 2 [a(q0L; 0); a(q0L; 1)] (see (7)), which implies




(q0L; 1))  UAL (c0L; a(q0L; 0)) = 0. Hence, UAH(cH ; a(q0L; 1))  0, meaning
that fc0L; cHg also satises IRH . Clearly, fc0L; cHg solves problem (10) for j = L, as is satises all
its constraints and UPL (c
0
L; a
(q0L; 0)) = SL(a
0
L), which is the maximum value that the objective
function can take without violating constraint IRL.









L)  UPL (c0H ; a0H), the menu of contracts fc0L; c0Hg satises all the constraints of
problem (10) for j = H. (Usually in this type of problem constraint ICH is not binding. I ignore
it in the remainder of this proof. A detailed proof that the solutions derived here satisfy it can
be found in Vasconcelos, 2008). Clearly, fc0L; c0Hg solves the problem, as UPH(c0H ; a(q0H ; 1)) =
SH(a
0
H), which is the maximum value that the objective function can take without violating
constraint IRH .










H), then bcH = (btH ; q) where q > q0H and btH = UAA (0; q; a(q; 1)).
Consider problem (10) for j = H. Because the best separating allocation fbcL;bcHg necessarily
solves (10) for both when j = L and when j = H and we already know that bcL = c0L, we can
restrict without loss of generality to menus of the type fc0L; cHg. Thus, ignoring constraint ICH ,
solving problem (10) for j = H amounts to solving
max
tH ;qH
UPH(tH ; qH ; a
(qH ; 1)) (12)
s.t. (i) SL(a0L)  UPL (tH ; qH ; a(qH ; 1)) (ICL)
(ii) UAH(tH ; qH ; a
(qH ; 1))  0 (IRH)
In any solution to problem (12), at least one of the constraints ICL or IRH is binding. If
this were not the case, then it would be possible to increase tH by an arbitrarily small amount
" > 0 and still have all the constraints in the problem satised (including ICH) while increasing











ICL is the binding constraint of problem (12) when qH = q0H . By Lemma 6 (in this appendix),
there exists q 2 [q0H ; 1] such that ICL is the binding constraint for qH 2 [q0H ; q] and IRH is the
binding constraint for qH 2 [q; 1]. Let UPH(qH) denote the function obtained by replacing tH
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in the objective function of problem (12) with its value obtained from the binding constraint
given qH . That is, UPH(qH) = UPH(0; qH ; a(qH ; 1))   UPL (0; qH ; a(qH ; 1)) + SL(a0L) if qH < q
and UPH(qH) = SH(a(qH ; 1)) if qH 2 [q; 1]. Solving problem (12) consists of maximizing UPH .
First, note that UPH is decreasing for qH 2 [q; 1]. This is because SH is concave, SH reaches its
maximum value at a0H (which is equal to a
(q0H ; 1)), and the facts that a
(q; 1) increases with
q and q  q0H . Next, note that UPH increases with qH when q < q0H . To see this, observe that
@UPH(qH)=@qH = @[UPH(0; qH ; a(qH ; 1))  UPL (0; qH ; a(qH ; 1))]=@qH
+@[UPH(0; qH ; a
(qH ; 1))  UPL (0; qH ; a(qH ; 1))]=@a @a(qH ; 1)=@qH .
The rst term is equal to fE [VE j L]   E [VE j H]g=2 and is positive. The second term is
equal to v0A(a
(qH ; 1))[PH(a(qH ; 1)) PL(a(qH ; 1))]@a(qH ; 1)=@qH and is non-negative since
@a(qH ; 1)=@qH  0 (see Lemma 1) and PH(a)  PL(a) for all a. Hence, the solution to problem
(12) is given by qH = q and the contract of the principal of type H associated with the best
separating allocation is bcH = (btH ; q), where btH is such that IRH binds.18 The payo¤ of the
principal associated with this contract is SH(a(q; 1)) < SH(a0H).
Proof of Proposition 1. This proof consists of showing that there exist o¤-the-equilibrium
path beliefs and continuation equilibria such that no deviation to another menu m0 is prof-
itable. Let bH(m0) and bH(c;m0) denote the agents beliefs that the principal is of type H
after observing, respectively, that the principal proposed a menu m0 2 M and that principal
chose contract c among those she proposed in m0. Note that the concept of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium imposes no restriction on beliefs bH(m0) o¤-the-equilibrium path. However, even
o¤-the-equilibrium path, it requires: (i) that bH(c;m0) be consistent with beliefs bH(m0) and
prescribed equilibrium play by the principal when choosing a contract from m0 (consistency of
beliefs); and (ii) that after the principals proposal of m0, the prescribed equilibrium play by
the principal (choice of c inm0) and the agent (decision to accept or reject m0 and of investment
level a) be optimal given beliefs bH(m0) and bH(c;m0) and the other players strategy (sequen-
tial rationality). Thus, any beliefs and continuation equilibrium used in this proof must satisfy
these requirements.
Suppose that the principal deviates and proposes to the agent a menu m0 2M such that for
all beliefs bH(m0) and all continuation equilibria the agent accepts it. (A deviation to a menu
that is rejected by the agent is trivially not optimal to the principal.) I next show that there
18The solution to problem (12) cannot involve a contract specifying a quantity smaller than q0H , since IC(L)
is also the binding constraint for qH < q0H .
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are also beliefs bH(m0) and a continuation equilibrium following the proposal of m0 in which
the payo¤ to the principal of type j is no larger than bUPj , 8j 2 fL;Hg. This is done in three
steps. In the rst two, I derive properties that menu m0 must satisfy.
Step 1: UPL (c; a
(c; 0))  bUPL 8c 2 m0.
To see this, consider the following beliefs and continuation equilibrium: bH(m0) = 0;
bH(c;m
0) = 0 8c 2 m0; each type of principal chooses the contract in m0 that maximizes her
expected payo¤ given that bH(c;m0) = 0. Since bUPL = SL(a0L), m0 must satisfy UPL (c; a(c; 0)) bUPL 8c 2 m0, otherwise the payo¤ to the principal of type L would be strictly larger than
SL(a
0
L), which by (3) (e¢ cient ex-post renegotiation) would imply a strictly negative expected
payo¤ to the agent from accepting m0. This would violate the assumption that m0 is always
accepted by the agent.
Step 2: Let CH = fc 2 m0 : UPH(c; a(c; 0)) > bUPHg. If CH 6= ?, then UPH(c; a(c; 1))  bUPH
8c 2 CH .
This is shown by contradiction. Suppose to the contrary that UPH(c; a
(c; 1)) > bUPH for some
c 2 CH . Consider in this case the following beliefs and continuation equilibrium: bH(m0) = 1;
bH(c;m
0) = 1 if c 2 CH and bH(c;m0) = 0 if c 2 m0nCH ; each type of principal chooses the
contract fromm0 that maximizes her payo¤given beliefs bH(c;m0). In this continuation equilib-
rium, the principal of type H chooses a contract in CH and has payo¤max
c2CH
UPH(c; a
(c; 1)) > bUPH .
If bUPH = SH(a0H) (i.e., UPL (c0L; a0L)  UPL (c0H ; a0H) and IRH is the binding constraint in problem
(12) when qH = q0H), then by (3) (e¢ cient ex-post renegotiation) the agents expected payo¤
is negative. If bUPH = SH(a(q; 1)) (i.e., UPL (c0L; a0L) < UPL (c0H ; a0H) and ICL is the binding con-
straint in problem (12) when qH = q0H), then by Lemma 6 all the contracts in CH specify a
quantity q > q and so does the contract chosen by the principal of type H. From the fact that
SH(a
(q; 1)) < SH(a(q; 1)) 8q > q and (3) (e¢ cient ex-post renegotiation), it follows that also
in this case the agents expected payo¤must be negative. Thus, both when bUPH = SH(a0H) and
when bUPH = SH(a(q; 1)), the agents expected payo¤ is negative. This is a contradiction as m0
is by assumption a menu that is accepted by the agent for all beliefs bH(m0) and continuation
equilibrium.
Step 3: There exist beliefs bH(m0) and a continuation equilibrium following the proposal of
m0 in which the payo¤ to the principal of type j is no larger than bUPj , 8j 2 fL;Hg.
There are two possible cases regarding menu m0 which I consider separately. Suppose rst
that CH = ?. This means that UPH(c; a(c; 0))  bUPH 8c 2 m0. From Step 1, we know that
UPL (c; a
(c; 0))  bUPL 8c 2 m0. Hence, UPj (c; a(c; 0))  bUPj 8c 2 m0 and 8j 2 fL;Hg. Consider
the following beliefs and continuation equilibrium: bH(m0) = 0; bH(c;m0) = 0 8c 2 m0; each
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type of principal chooses the contract in m0 that maximizes her expected payo¤ given that
bH(c;m
0) = 0. Clearly, in this continuation equilibrium the payo¤ of the principal of type j is
no larger than bUPj 8j 2 fL;Hg and the result trivially holds.
Suppose now that CH 6= ?. Consider the following beliefs: 8c 2 m0nCH let bH(c;m0) = 0
while 8c 2 CH let bH(c;m0) be such that UPH (c; a(c; bH(c;m0))) = bUPH . Let us denote these
beliefs by ebH(c;m0). Note that they always exist, since (i) UPH(c; a(c; 1))  bUPH (by Step 2)
and UPH(c; a
(c; 0)) > bUPH 8c 2 CH , and (ii) UPH(c; a(c; bH)) is continuous in bH . Let ecL denote
the best contract in m0 for the principal of type L given beliefs ebH(c;m). Suppose rst thatecL =2 CH , then beliefs bH(m0) = 0, bH(c;m0) = ebH(c;m0) 8c 2 m0, together with the principal of
type L choosing contract ecL and the principal of typeH choosing any contract in CH constitutes
a continuation equilibrium following the proposal of m0. In this continuation equilibrium, the
agent accepts menu m0 and the payo¤ of the principal of type j is no larger than bUPj , 8j 2
fL;Hg. Suppose now that ecL 2 CH . In this case, the beliefs bH(m0) = ebH(ecL;m0), bH(c;m0) =ebH(c;m0) 8c 2 m0, together with both types of principal choosing contract ecL constitutes a
continuation equilibrium following the proposal of m0. In this continuation equilibrium, both
types of principal have lower payo¤s than those associated with the best separating allocation:
for the principal of type H this is obvious; while for the principal of type L the result follows
from the fact that by Step 1 UPL (ecL; a(ecL; 0))  bUPL , the fact that the expected payo¤ of the
principal of type H decreases with an increase in investment from a(c; 0) to a(c;ebH(c;m0))
8c 2 CH , and from Lemma 2. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. The rst part of the proposition follows directly from Lemma 3
and Proposition 1. Hence, this proof consists of showing that for some specications of the
model only equilibria with ine¢ cient investment level exist. In any equilibrium with e¢ cient
investment, the principal of type j chooses a contract (tj; q0j ), 8j 2 fL;Hg, and the agent learns
the principals type from the choice of contract. The maximum payo¤of the principal of type H












L)  UPL (tH ; q0H ; a0H)
and (ii) (1   H)UAL (tL; q0L; a0L) + HUAH(tH ; q0H ; a0H). Constraint (i) ensures that the principal
of type L has no incentive to deviate by choosing contract (tH ; q0H) instead of contract (tL; q
0
L).
Under constraint (ii), it is individually rational for the agent to accept the menu with contracts
(tH ; q
0
H) and (tL; q
0



















L)   UPL (tH ; q0H ; a0H)]. Using (3), this implies a payo¤ UPH =
HSH(a
0
H)+ (1  H)[SL(a0L)+UPH(tH ; q0H ; a0H) UPL (tH ; q0H ; a0H). This payo¤ can be compared
with the payo¤ the principal of type H can ensure herself in any equilibrium. There exists
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eq > q > qH0 such that UAH(t; eq; a(eq; bH))  UAL (t; eq; a(eq; bH)) for all t 2 R and all bH 2 [0; 1].
Thus, the principals proposal of contract q = eq and t = UAH(t; eq; a(eq; 1)) is accepted by
the agent regardless of his beliefs. Since UPH(c; a
(c; bH)) decreases with bH when q  q0H
(see proof of Lemma 4), the minimum payo¤ for the principal if he proposes contract q = eq
and t = UAH(t; eq; a(eq; 1)) is UPH(0; eq; a(eq; 1)) + UAH(t; eq; a(eq; 1)) = SH(a(eq; 1)). Whether this
payo¤ exceeds the maximum payo¤ in an e¢ cient equilibrium depends on the parametrization
of the model. For the special case of the model presented in Section 2.1, the lowest eq is
(2 + 2pH)=(4   2). In that case, SH(a(eq; 1)) exceeds the maximum payo¤ UPH derived
above when H = 0 if 
2+ 2pH
  
8pH   2  32pH

2 
4  22 > 4 (2pH   1) (pH   pL) + 2 (2pL   pH)2 .
This condition is satised, for example, when 2=(8   32) < pH  1=2 and pL = pH=2.
In these cases, its left-hand side is positive whereas its right-hand side is non-positive. Since
by assumption 2 < , then 2=(8   32)  0:4. Hence, for example, for H close to zero,
pL = pH=2 and 0:4 < pH  0:5, there exists no equilibria with e¢ cient investment level.
Proof of Lemma 4. This proof consists of showing that there exist contracts (one for each
type of principal) that when proposed by the principal ensure her the e¢ cient total surplus.
Throughout the proof, let UA(c; a; bH)  (1   bH)UAL (c; a) + bHUAH(c; a). Suppose that the
principal of type L proposes contract cL = (t0L; q
0
L; e = 0) and the principal of type H proposes




H ; 1; a
(q0H ; 1)).
I rst show that the agent accepts both contracts regardless of his beliefs, i.e., UA(cj; a(cj; bH); bH) 
0 8bH 2 [0; 1] and 8j 2 fL;Hg. By construction, UA(cL; a(cL; bH); bH) = 0 when bH = 0.
Since contract cL species quantity q0L, it follows from Condition 1 that U
A(cL; a
(cL; bH); bH)
increases with bH . Thus, UA(cL; a(cL; bH); bH)  0 8bH 2 [0; 1]. Similarly, by construction,
UA(cH ; a
(cH ; bH); bH) = 0 when bH = 1. Di¤erentiating UA(cH ; a(cH ; bH); bH) with respect
to bH (and using the Envelope Theorem), we obtain UAH (cH ; a
(cH ; bH))  UAL (cH ; a(cH ; bH)).
From direct inspection of (4) and the fact that contract cH species e = 1, this di¤erence is equal
to E [maxfV (a(cH ; bH)); VEg j H] =2   E [maxfV (a(cH ; bH)); VEg j L] =2, which is negative
since by assumption FL rst-order stochastically dominates FH . Thus, UA(cH ; a(cH ; bH); bH)
decreases with bH , which implies that UA(cH ; a(cH ; bH); bH)  0 8bH 2 [0; 1].
I next show that the payo¤ of the principal of type j following the agents acceptance
of contract cj is no less than Sj(a0j) 8 j 2 fL;Hg. By construction of cL and cH and the
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fact that a(q0L; bH = 0) = a
0
L and a
(q0H ; bH = 1) = a
0









(cH ; 1)) = SH(a0H). Hence, to obtain that U
P
j (cj; a
(cj; bH))  Sj(a0j)
8bH 2 [0; 1] and 8j 2 fL;Hg, it remains only to show that UPL (cL; a(cL; bH)) increases with
bH and UPH(cH ; a
(cH ; bH)) decreases with bH . Using (7) and the chain rule to di¤erentiate
UPj (cj; a
(cj; bH)) with respect to bH , we obtain
1=2 v0A(a(q0j ; bH)) [Pj(a(q0j ; bH))  q0j ] @a(q0j ; bH)=@bH . (13)
By assumption, v0A > 0. By Lemma 1, @a
(q; bH)=@bH  0 8q; bH 2 [0; 1]. Since Pj(a) increases
with a and a(q0j ; bH) increases with bH , then Pj(a
(q0j ; bH)) increases with bH 8j 2 fL;Hg. This
implies that PL(a(q0L; bH))  PL(a(q0L; 0))  q0L and PH(a(q0H ; bH))  PH(a(q0H ; 1)) = q0H 8
bH 2 [0; 1]. Hence, for j = L, (13) is positive and, for j = H, it is negative.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider an equilibrium and let eUPj denote the principals payo¤
in state j in that equilibrium, for all j 2 fL;Hg. Lemma 4 implies that eUPj  Sj(a0j) for all
j 2 fL;Hg. Individual rationality of the agent implies that it is not possible that eUPj  Sj(a0j)
for all j 2 fL;Hg and, simultaneously, eUPj > Sj(a0j) for some j 2 fL;Hg. The two preceding
results imply that eUPj = Sj(a0j) for all j 2 fL;Hg. From individual rationality of the agent
and the fact that eUPj = Sj(a0j) for all j 2 fL;Hg, it follows that investment must be e¢ cient
(rst-best) in both states L and H.
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